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Abstract 
 
We propose a method for projecting pension benefits, deriving from DC pension plans and 
other funded products, at retirement. Projections highlight how the current choice of asset 
allocation impacts on future potential retirement outcomes. The latter are compared with a 
money-back benchmark so as to clarify the trade-off between risk and return. After the initial 
projections, the pension plan revises its forecasts of retirement benefits on a yearly basis as a 
function of its own realized returns. Previous shorter-term projections are also compared to 
shorter-term ex-post performance. This simple method is a step towards an industry-reporting 
standard that responds to regulators’ quest for helping investors monitor the risk of their future 
pension. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Defined contribution pension plans around the world report their performance in non-
homogeneous ways to their members (Antolín and Harrison, 2012). A common feature they share 
is a focus on the returns obtained in the recent past. This practice does not necessarily convey 
information on longer-term returns, even if pension investment is for the long run. On the one 
hand, returns on certain assets may be close to unpredictable, in which case their past returns do 
not forecast future ones. On the other hand, projecting future outcomes given past performance is 
likely to exceed the household’s ability, even if the pension fund invested in assets with 
predictable returns. There are very few instances of pension plans that report expectations of 
future returns. However, this does not convey to pension members information on the range of 
future pension benefits, and on how possible outcomes depend on alternative asset allocations 
and levels of contribution.  
 
This paper proposes a method for projecting pension benefits in future years until retirement 
(given some contribution installments). Importantly, projections provide the plan member 
information about the trade-off between higher returns and higher risk taking. It then elaborates 
on how the pension fund may compare its recent realized performance to its previous short-term 
forecasts, and revise its projections of benefits at retirement as a function of its own actual 
returns.   
 
Our proposal has three main features:  
(a) pension forecasts refer to the retirement horizon of the plan member;  
(b) both projections and ex-post realized performance are compared to an easy-to-grasp 
benchmark;  
(c) yearly realized performance is assessed against the pension fund's previous yearly projections. 
 
The first characteristic, "mark-to-retirement", stands in contrast with commonly used reporting 
methods. Drawing investors' attention towards longer-term goals may help improve their ability 
to allocate their savings. This longer-horizon perspective may indeed counter the investor’s 
tendency to pour money into funds with high past returns at monthly or quarterly frequencies 
(Del Guercio and Tkac; 2002, Rakowski and Wang, 2009), and more generally to poorly time the 
market, which reduces their average returns (Friesen and Sapp, 2007). Moreover, this approach 
makes it possible to assess the consistency of goals with the assumed installment plan. 
 
The second characteristic of our framework is represented by the benchmark against which 
pension fund performance is evaluated, i.e. a purchasing power equivalent, real terms money-
back indicator. We depart from currently used benchmarks (Lehmann and Timmermann, 2008), 
which juxtapose realized fund returns to those of a portfolio with comparable risk exposure. Our 
benchmark is closer to the maturity-matched Inflation Indexed Bonds (IIB), that are almost 
riskless securities for a long-term investor with the same investment horizon as the bond maturity 
(see Bodie and Treussard, 2007). Projections against a riskless comparable allow plan members 
to appreciate the upside potential of risky assets, at the same time making them aware of their 
downside risk. Clearly, the benchmark we propose (the CPI) is easier to beat for the pension fund 
than a portfolio of inflation-linked bonds that usually provide a real return besides the indexation 
to inflation of the principal. Primarily, however, our benchmark is easier to project. Returns on 
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IIBs – which ought to be applied to contributions in order to mark-to-retirement the benchmark 
return – require reliable inflation-linked bond performance indices that are not currently available 
in each country, while the CPI index is one of the most established statistics.  
Our proposal also requires the fund to contrast realized risk-return performance against its own 
previous projections. The more optimistic the ex ante projections, the worse the current 
performance will appear relative to expected outcomes. This feature disciplines pension fund 
managers when making initial projections, as plan members may leave the fund ex post if faced 
with blatant inconsistencies. We recommend that such an exercise be performed annually, 
although longer-term ex-post performance reports on a five- or ten- year basis would easily fit in 
our framework. 
A key characteristic of our method is tying past performance and projected performance on a 
rolling base.  In turn, this is simpler when the focus is on returns and financial wealth rather than 
pension income. Such focus is a shortcoming in countries, such as the Netherlands or Italy, where 
annuitization at retirement is respectively fully or partially compulsory. Conversion into annuities 
adds another relevant risk dimension, relating to the interest rate at retirement. We therefore 
illustrate information on this (augmented) risk-return trade-off with reference to prospective 
pension annuities, too.  
 
This paper is a starting point towards the design of a reporting standard for pension plans and, 
more generally, for long-term financial investment plans. This reporting standard would 
complement the existing ones, GIPS, that allow for short-term performance comparisons (see 
GIPS, 2006), through its focus on longer-term financial investment assessments. With a similar 
angle, a recent paper by the Group of Thirty (2013) states that accounting methods that embed a 
short-term horizon are a potential impediment to long-term finance, and suggest a new approach  
called  target-date accounting.  
 
 
Viceira (2010) and (Bagliano, Fugazza and Nicodano, 2010) respectively suggest a method to 
inform on the trade-off between risk and return at retirement and a benchmark for the 
performance evaluation of pension funds. Our proposal departs from them in two main ways. 
First, it combines in an integrated framework both periodic performance evaluation and longer-
term risk return projections. Secondly, it focuses on a benchmark that is easy to understand for 
plan beneficiaries.   
 
Traditional performance evaluation scrutinizes managerial skills such as security selection and 
market timing that allow asset managers to systematically earn risk-adjusted returns above the 
market returns (Lehmann and Timmerman, 2008). Our example assumes away return 
predictability and security selection activities– thereby abstracting from abnormal returns. Here, 
performance evaluation investigates whether the strategic asset allocation, together with the 
chosen contribution path, allows managers to both return the purchasing power of contributions 
and reach a desired range of monthly pension payments. 
 
The Chilean Pension Supervisor experiments, since 2012, with a simulator that provides 
stochastic projections of future pension benefits   (see Antolin and Fuentes, 2012; and Berstein 
et al., 2013). Their focus is on re replacement rates at retirement, rather than on cumulated 
wealth as in our main proposal. They carefully model stochastic labour income as a function of 
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personal characteristics. On the contrary, we expand on pension income sensitivity to interest 
rate risk when we shift from projected pension assets to projected income.  Interestingly, the 
Chilean experiment reveals that pension members face difficulties understanding information 
related to pension risk - even when provided with simple words. This is why we resort to graphs 
that highlight the money-back benchmark, so as to convey the idea of both downside and upside 
potential.    
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below describes our base proposal for a 
reporting framework, in real terms. Section 3 - 4 project a monthly pension equivalent instead 
of accumulated capital, which may help plan members to understand the reports better. Section 
4 discusses alternative inflation and wage growth scenarios. Section 5 indicates possible 
extensions. Appendix A addresses the sensitivity of monthly pension projections to interest rate 
volatility. Appendix B explains how to report in current euro.  
2.  A Mark-to-Retirement Reporting Framework  
Our reporting framework is composed of a limited number of figures and tables, along with a 
model to produce them.  
Figure 1 below shows the type of asset allocation across time underlying the model. 
Figure 2 reports the possible values of pension assets at retirement (time T) against an easy-to-
grasp benchmark, at current purchasing power. This picture is prepared at the time the pension 
member joins the fund (time 0), under assumptions concerning the distribution of asset returns as 
specified below.   
Figure 3 reports the possible values of pension assets and of the benchmark after one year (time 
1), highlighting the realized value of pension assets. This picture allows the investor to compare 
the realized return against the pension fund's initial projections.  
Figure 4 repeats the simulation of the distribution of pension assets at retirement, starting from 
their current (time 1) realized value1. Table I gathers all maintained assumptions. Tables II and 
III report some summary statistics concerning, respectively, time 0 and time 1 projections. The 
Figures 3 and 4, along with the corresponding Tables, will be updated every year. They can be 
interpreted as mark-to-market and mark-to-retirement, respectively. 
Figure 5 shows wage payments in retirement, and the replacement rates. It represents the 
translation of the above mentioned pension assets at retirement in an annuity, conditional on the 
level of interest rates and given a set of standard actuarial assumptions. 
The model is characterized by the following choices, as summarized in Table 1: the asset menu, 
which should coincide with the menu adopted by the pension fund; the return distribution; the 
asset allocation; the contribution profile; the benchmark; the treatment of transaction costs; real 
wage growth; and a set of parameters.  
                                                 
1
 As will become clear later, we are still using time 0 euro. 
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In our example, only “stocks” (high-risk assets) and “ten-years duration bonds” (low-risk assets) 
belong to the asset menu. We allow real and bond stock returns to be jointly log-normally 
distributed with known mean, variance and correlation, as is customary in the literature on long-
term asset allocation. Both stock and bond returns are independently distributed in time.  
We assume that the plan member contributes a monthly amount until retirement. Our benchmark 
capital is the sum of all contributions, capitalized at the expected inflation rate. In our example 
we assume that a 20- years- old worker contributes 100 € each month in the first year. With zero 
wage growth, benchmark capital at retirement is equal to 48,000 €.  
We acknowledge the existence of both transaction costs of new contributions and a yearly fee 
levied on Assets Under Management (AUM). We do not compute them when projecting 
benchmark capital: in this respect, our benchmark is equivalent to a money-back equivalent sum 
in real terms. This benchmark will be compared with the value of accumulated assets net of costs. 
Thus, the pension fund beats the benchmark if its real return exceeds its costs.2 Absent any cost, 
the minimum real pension fund return needed to meet the benchmark is equal to 0%. It becomes 
0.43% to compensate yearly AUM fees equal to 0.4% (compounded quarterly) and transaction 
costs on new money, of 0.05%.3 
The yearly mean real return on equities is equal to 5.5% with 18% volatility. It is assumed to be 
independently distributed in time. The real interest rate on constant maturity bonds is 2.5% with 
volatility 3%. The correlation between risky assets and bond returns is set to 0.1. 
In the example shown in the first set of tables and graphs, the chosen asset allocation entails 20% 
in bonds and 80% in stocks, with quarterly rebalancing, as portrayed in Figure 1. 
2.1 Projecting Future Pension Assets and the Risk-Return Trade- Off   
This section addresses more specifically the information about the long-term risk return trade-off 
given to a new pension plan member, age 25, with T=40 years to retirement. Figure 2 reports 
projected pension assets from age 25 to age 65 over 2,000 possible scenarios that originate from a 
random drawing of stock and bond returns from their assumed joint distribution. 
Our "money-back" benchmark, gross of fund costs, appears in red. Mean accumulated assets 
appear in black. This picture clearly conveys the upside potential of equity investing, together 
with its downside risk. 
The statistics at the bottom (Table II) provide some quantitative information. The first column 
indicates the probability of not reaching the "money-back" benchmark (3.35%) after 40 years. 
This is the observed proportion of scenarios that end up with accumulated assets below 
benchmark. The maximum shortfall with respect to the benchmark is equal to € -23,299.75, while 
                                                 
2
 Pension funds often invest in mutual funds, which charge additional fees, instead of individual securities. These 
fees should not affect benchmark capital, either.  We overlook transaction costs associated with quarterly 
rebalancing. Thus our simulations overstate pension fund return projections. Throughout the analysis, we do not 
consider distortions induced by taxation. We discuss other maintained assumptions in Section 4. 
3
 Those figures complete our example, but a regulator may want to establish a cost benchmark. 
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the average of all scenarios ending below the money-back benchmark is € -6,772.41. The second 
column reveals that the average amount of accumulated assets is equal to € 177,597.05, while the 
minimum equals € 24,747.04. The last four rows report upper and lower percentile boundary 
figures: these provide an idea of the accumulated assets associated with highly probable 
outcomes on the upside as well as on the downside. For instance, the last two read like “there is a 
15% probability that accumulated assets will end below € 76,519.86; and a 5% probability they 
will end below € 53,064.12”. 
2.2. Reporting Pension Performance One Year Later  
Figure 3 allows the pension or investment plan member to assess the performance of her pension 
fund one year later. It highlights, with a blue mark, the actual ex-post accumulated assets against 
both the projected ones and the "money-back" benchmark in red. In the example, the gross-of-
fees-and-transaction-costs realized return is equal to -30.4%, leaving her with € 1,000 instead of 
€ 1,200. Thus, the blue mark appears below the money-back benchmark. This picture does not 
depart from the logic of mark-to-market pension assets; however, it allows the plan participant to 
acknowledge that the (negative) performance result was among the ones considered possible ex-
ante.  
In other words, a plan member should understand that there might be large transitory deviations 
from the benchmark even in the case of a DC-plan that exactly matches an inflation-indexed 
benchmark. The plan will eventually deliver the expected return over the entire period because it 
is matched. The next section describes mark-to-maturity, which allows us to cast performance 
evaluation in a long-horizon perspective.  
2.3. Updating Future Pension Assets and the Risk-Return Trade-Off.   
Figure 4 allows the investment plan member to understand the implications of realized 
performance in a retirement perspective by projecting her assets to age 65, given the actual 
performance realized during the first year and her initial asset allocation. Both the red and the 
black benchmark appear clearly in Figure 4. 
Obviously, a below-mean performance after one year makes it less likely that the plan participant 
will reach the "money-back" benchmark (the probability increases to 3.80%, up from 3.35%, and 
the average shortfall increases from €5361 to €5446, as stated in Table III 4 ). But mean 
accumulated assets are equal to € 179,392.88. Note that the mean accumulated assets have 
roughly remained the same as in the t=0 example. This indicates that a long time horizon allows 
for the possibility of offsetting initial adverse shocks, making it less sensible to deviate from a 
pre-determined investment policy. This holds true even in the (unreported) case of a loss of all 
initial contributions: the probability of ending below the benchmark increases to 4.3%, the 
average shortfall jumps as high as €8006 and average accumulated assets fall slightly to 
€175,075. 
                                                 
4
 Section 2 assumes that realized wage growth and realized inflation are both equal  to 0%, in line with 
expectations. This is indeed the simplest case.   
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By comparison, consider a member that starts contributing two years from retirement. At the 
beginning she expects as cumulated assets equal to €2,522, against a benchmark capital of 
€2,400. The probability of ending below the benchmark is high (36%) with an average shortfall 
of €178. After all of the contributions are lost in the first year, the average accumulated assets fall 
to €1,228, well below the benchmark, the probability of not reaching the target jumps to 100% 
and the average shortfall is equal to €1172. 
3. Reporting Monthly Pension Equivalent of Accumulated Asset. 
Our previous framework reports the projected amount of accumulated and capitalized 
contributions at retirement. This does not clearly inform beneficiaries on consumption 
possibilities, which is a central demand of plan members. This information is better conveyed by 
the replacement rate -- i.e. the ratio of the annual pension annuity to wage.5 But replacement 
ratios are less clearly associated with fund performance and their determination is not 
straightforward in a DC world. Our proposal, which aims at easing long-term performance 
evaluation, thus focuses primarily on the projected amount of contributions. 
However, we do engage in the further step that consists of converting accumulated capital at 
retirement in a monthly pension pay. This exercise allows to highlight another relevant 
dimension of risk. The monthly pension pay will depend on the conversion rate between the 
capital at retirement and annuities, which in turn will be a function of a set of factors such as 
interest rates, mortality, transaction costs, fees, and so forth. In section 3.1. we also contrast the 
projected pension annuity/ drawdown profile with a desired pension payment, computed as a 
percentage of the current wage (i.e. a component of a replacement rate at retirement) 6. This 
kind of reporting, based on further assumptions concerning the length of life after retirement, 
allows the pension member to assess the income/consumption possibilities, and their variability 
as a function of the interest rate that will prevail at retirement.  
 
Appendix A1 takes an additional step, by explicitly modeling stochastic interest rates in order to 
show that particular kinds of asset allocation are able to contain the variability of consumption 
in response to interest rate shocks. Pension members who either must annuitize or choose to do 
so, may prefer a portfolio at retirement that is “conformable” with the annuities pay-out. 
Appendix A1 provides three reporting examples based on alternative asset allocations that 
differently immunize prospective annuities from interest rate volatility. 
 
3.1.Communicating Monthly Pension Equivalent of Accumulated Assets 
 
In this section we translate the results portrayed in Figure 2, which are expressed in terms of total 
accumulated assets,  into annuities (i.e. into an equivalent monthly pay received after retirement). 
This kind of reporting best suits those systems that partially or fully annuitize DC pension 
                                                 
5 Pension authorities use replacement ratios in order to communicate pension adequacy – for instance, in the 
Swedish “orange envelope”. See also the Chilean pension simulator that projects DC pension benefits at 
retirement (Berstein et al, 2013). 
6 It is also possible to highlight an alternative “annuities benchmark”. This is the conversion of the “real money-
back” capital in an annuity, given an expected real interest rate and given the expected age of retirement.  This 
benchmark is thus directly comparable with current wage. 
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benefits. Even for systems where annuities are not mandatory, this reporting method makes it 
possible to have a representation of the expected replacement rate of a DC plan in terms of 
current wages. 
 
In the examples that follow we will assume a life expectancy of 20 years post-retirement.7 
Moreover, we allow for 10 possible levels of conversion rates at retirement, which we use to 
convert real accumulated capital into a monthly real annuity. Conversion rates depend essentially 
on life expectancy and real interest rates. In our examples, life expectancy is fixed; thus, the 
variability of conversion rates depends on possible alternative real interest rates. We therefore 
convert each of the 2,000 simulated levels of accumulated capital above, using alternative interest 
rates. We start with a 1% real interest rate, and we average the 2,000 possible pays to achieve a 
monthly average pay of € 816.40. And we repeat this exercise for the other possible interest rates.  
 
Table IV shows all the results of the average monthly pension during retirement. It ranges from 
€816.40 when the interest rate is as low as 1%, to € 1,663.44 for a high level of the interest rate-
clearly displaying the sensitivity of pension income to the rate. The columns of table IV show the 
average monthly pay. We now see that the average pension would not be sufficient to match the 
desired income in some interest rate environments. Unless another source of pension wage is 
present, a participant may therefore want to increase her contribution.  
 
Communication can be further improved by highlighting the desired monthly pension as a 
percentage of the current wage. Figure 5 also displays the average “+ 1 standard deviation” and 
the average “- 1 standard deviation” pension, respectively labeled better and worse. The grey line 
in the figure shows the desired monthly pension per month, set at Euro € 875,00.8 The graph now 
makes clear that only better return scenarios allow the investor participant to hit the desired 
replacement rate when interest rate is low. As in Figure 2, the black line indicates the real money-
back benchmark, converted into monthly annuity payments, which rises with higher real interest 
rates. A conservative participant may even want to limit the projected gap between the two lines 
by raising monthly contributions during the accumulation phase. 
 
A problem with these representations is that the pension fund, which is responsible for the reports 
we are addressing, may not be able to control the terms of annuity provision. A second difficulty 
is that inflation protected annuities, like the ones portrayed in Table IV and Figure 5, are very 
seldom marketed by insurance companies.  
4.   Pension Fund Reporting, Inflation and Real Wage Growth. 
Sections 2 and 3 assume that realized wage growth and realized inflation are both equal to 0%, in 
line with expectations. This is the simplest possible case, but hides three issues.  
First, realizations typically differ from expectations. Over time, such differences may become so 
large as to make projections no longer meaningful for the plan member. We suggest that such 
                                                 
7 Users of this reporting scheme may refer to mortality tables (conditional on country, age, sex …) to get better 
estimates.   
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In the Netherlands, the most common wage (modus) is about € 35,000 a year. If we take 30% of this wage 
(which roughly accounts for the Dutch second-pillar part of retirement pay) and divide by 12 we get € 875.00.
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realizations be incorporated in the projection updates (as in  Figure 4) every year. Appendix B 
provides an example with positive realized wage growth, where contributions increase with real 
wages. It also allows for positive realized inflation. In order to make the projected pension pay 
bear a clear link to current pay, it is better to change the base year every year – rather than 
leaving it unchanged at t=0.  
Second, a pension plan may use alternative expected wage growth or inflation scenarios. An 
alternative inflation scenario is irrelevant as long as inflation is non-stochastic (see the example 
in section 4.1. below). On the contrary, positive wage growth scenarios imply growing 
contributions, which increase benchmark capital at retirement. Alternative wage growth 
scenarios can thus be used, but they should always be compared to the conservative default 
option of zero expected growth.  
Last but not least, previous sections assume non-stochastic inflation – or, that inflation risk can 
be fully hedged at no cost. Such costs, when present, ought instead to be deducted from return 
projections. Moreover, projections understate the risk of asset allocations that are tilted towards 
imperfect inflation hedges such as long-term nominal bonds. Section 4.2 indicates the way to 
explicitly embed stochastic inflation into our reporting framework. We postpone until section 
5.2 a discussion about stochastic wage growth. 
4.1. Non-Stochastic Inflation 
Assume that the expected inflation rate is equal to 2% (ECB benchmark). If the inflation rate is 
non-stochastic, then it is perfectly anticipated. It follows that nominal returns on assets are equal 
to 7.5% for stocks and 4.5% for bonds, respectively with no change in real returns, volatility and 
correlation. The yearly nominal return, ensuring that the value of pension assets will be equal to 
the benchmark at retirement, is equal to 2.44%. With these changes, the average, maximum and 
minimum returns on accumulated assets roughly coincide with the ones described above, without 
inflation.   
4.2. Stochastic Inflation 
Let us now assume that the inflation rate has non-zero volatility. This is going to increase 
(reduce) the expected real return on assets that are good (bad) inflation hedges, thus changing the 
range of possible outcomes at retirement in Figure 2. One way to account for this is to estimate a 
forecasting model where the distribution of asset returns is a function of the inflation rate, as in 
Campbell, Sunderam and Viceira (2013) or more simply in Briére et al. (2011) and Fugazza, 
Guidolin and Nicodano (2010). The reporting scheme should not otherwise be affected by 
stochastic inflation. Even if realized inflation differs from what had been expected, both ex post 
performance and revised projections are a function of real variables only. A higher-than- 
expected inflation will depress the realized real return on pension assets below the expected 
outcomes, if these assets are not good inflation hedges; and will require higher nominal 
contributions in order to keep projected contributions constant in real terms. 
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5. Discussion 
Our framework provides an example of a reporting standard based on relatively straightforward 
calculation rules that can be performed by pension plans and understood by plan members.  
While the reporting standard should be based on common scenarios and layouts to ease 
comparisons, the underlying framework lends itself to other uses. It can accommodate alternative 
communication frameworks (future pension assets or monthly pension equivalent) and inflation 
and growth scenarios. It is also possible to simulate the consequences of competing choices by 
the plan member, thus contributing to financial education. For instance, a worker may ask to have 
her exposure to the stock market reduced after negative performance, such as the one portrayed 
in Figure 3. This framework can produce new projections associated with a more defensive asset 
allocation, revealing that lower risk entails lower upside potential.   
Sections 5.1-5.4 discuss our choices against alternatives that imply substantial departures from 
the current simple settings. 
 
 
 5.1. An alternative benchmark 
The purchasing power of a future pension is what matters to a prospective retiree. Along these 
lines, Bodie and Treussard (2007) assume that contributions are invested in a maturity matched 
inflation-indexed bond at time 0, whose principal value is indexed to the CPI and pays, 
additionally, a coupon. This way, it is possible to get rid of all (but insolvency) risks. They also 
suggest using IIB as a performance benchmark.  
We could adopt the same approach.9 We opt instead for a benchmark with zero real return, which 
is compared with a net-of-fee return on pension assets under management. The rationale behind 
this proposal is the following. First, a CPI benchmark is easy to understand and communicate. 
Second, this benchmark has the desirable property of being achievable in normal circumstances 
of positive real interest rates, at least where there is a market for IIB, and also given that equities 
have historically provided positive real returns over longer periods.10 Third, attaining the CPI 
benchmark, while possible, is not straightforward. Markets for inflation-linked bonds are absent 
in some countries. Even where they exist, there may be discontinuity in the coverage of the yield 
curve, so that inflation cannot be hedged at all horizons without bearing some market risk11. 
Furthermore, covering inflation plus management costs remains a challenge in itself, especially 
when the time-to-retirement is short.  
The solution we propose here, besides being driven by a search for simplicity, may be able to 
satisfy the various parties involved: the investors, who would receive a standardized 
representation of retirement capital in real terms; the industry, which may be willing to adopt this 
                                                 
9
 In our framework, some real interest rate risk would still be present because contributions are invested 
throughout the life cycle (not just at t=0), and the rate on IIB that prevails in the future is unknown. 
10
 On the contrary, efficient benchmarks (with no transaction costs and no fees) on average beat the performance 
of net-of-fee asset managers by definition, thus generating misunderstandings with investors. Inefficient 
benchmarks such as stock indexes may be hard to beat in practice because of regulatory restrictions that prevent 
managers from investing outside the benchmark asset menu. 
11
 A similar observation motivates the investigation by Martellini and Milhau (2013). 
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reporting standard because it is offered an attainable benchmark; and the regulators, because this 
is consistent with investor protection principles. 
      5.2. A life-cycle approach 
There are several ways in which the model could benefit from life-cycle research. On the one 
hand, it may help design  the contribution path.  In our model, contributions grow together with 
the realized wage growth. However, a welfare-enhancing contribution profile connects 
contributions to the plan member's income and family composition, in such a way that 
contributions constrain less the consumption of young families and weigh more on older and 
richer families. 12 
Life-cycle research also recognizes that an investor's total wealth, and the risk she bears is 
derived not only from financial returns but from labor income as well. In certain countries, labor 
income gives rise to pension wealth in the form of first-pillar entitlements. Ideally, then, Figures 
2, 3 and 4 ought to portray the possible values of total accumulated assets, which may include 
also first-pillar entitlements. To the extent that such financial and labor incomes are not perfectly 
correlated, bad (good) financial shocks are compensated by good (bad) labor income shocks. This 
reasoning implies that the variability of total accumulated assets is likely to be smaller than that 
of pension fund assets only. Our proposal sidesteps this approach, in order to focus more closely 
on rolling performance assessment which requires focusing on the financial wealth generated by 
the pension plan.13 
5.3. Return predictability and rebalancing of contributions 
Our assumption of independent returns over time has several implications. On the one hand, it 
implies that future returns cannot be predicted on the basis of past realized returns, or past 
realized inflation, and so forth. Moreover, our assumption implies that there is no gain from 
active portfolio management. Finally, the annualized conditional variance of returns is 
independent of the investor’s horizon.  
There is, however, a large literature on return predictability, which shows that lagged returns, the 
inflation rate, the dividend-price ratio, the term premium and the default premium can explain 
current equity, real estate, bond and especially T-bill returns in in-sample experiments. 
Predictability impacts on optimal portfolio management, creating a difference between long- 
term and short-term management. Indeed, if returns on equities (bonds) are mean reverting 
(averting), then the equity (bond) annualized volatility over a long horizon is lower (higher) than 
the annualized volatility over a short horizon. An optimal long-run portfolio entails a higher 
                                                 
12
 Research on optimal life-cycle investments (among others see Benzoni et al., 2007; Bodie et al. (1992, 2009); 
Campbell et al., 2001; Cocco et al., 2005; and Koijen et al, 2010 and Bagliano et al., 2014) provides the logical 
background for consumption-smoothing contribution paths that are able to improve on the investor's welfare. 
13 However, the performance evaluation for pension plans may also be based on their ability to smooth 
consumption during retirement years (see Bagliano et al., 2010).  
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(lower) equity (bond) share than a short-term one does (Campbell and Viceira, 2005; Fugazza, 
Guidolin and Nicodano, 2007). However, there is no consensus, yet, as to whether these patterns 
are useful for improving future portfolio performance relative to simpler strategies (Goyal and 
Welch, 2008; Fugazza, Guidolin and Nicodano, 2014; Turner, 2014), or whether it is necessary to 
resort to more elaborate prediction models. This is why we stick to the simplest return 
representation which can, however, be changed without prejudice to the rest of the proposal. 
Our projections also keep the yearly contribution insensitive to realized returns. The projections 
could instead allow for increases in contributions after lower than-expected returns14. In this case, 
this feature should be incorporated also when building the ex ante accumulated assets 
projections. This dynamic "contribution rebalancing" strategy would yield better outcomes if 
portfolio returns were negatively correlated over time at the yearly frequency. 
 
5.4. Parameter uncertainty and forecast reliability 
Our framework assumes that forecasts of outcome ranges are reliable because the distribution of 
asset returns is known. On the contrary, the parameters (mean, variance, etc) of the assumed 
distribution are usually estimated from the data with errors. The latter affect comparatively more 
riskier than safer assets, and compound over time reducing the precision of long-term forecasts of 
riskier assets. In turn, this implies that long term risk-averse investors are less attracted by riskier 
assets relative to short-term investors because of this added uncertainty (see Barberis, 2000; 
Fugazza, Guidolin and Nicodano, 2009). Our reporting framework omits the modeling of such 
estimation error, thus implicitly understating the risk of riskier assets the more so, the longer the 
horizon. More generally, we do not provide any hint as to the reliability of the forecast. 
5.5. Outsourcing return forecasts used in projections? 
Projections rely on the distribution of returns on several asset classes. In our proposal, these are 
chosen by each pension fund on the grounds that each could have views on asset prospects that 
motivate their proposed asset allocation. At the same time, incentives to boost returns in order to 
attract new members should be mitigated by the knowledge that disappointed members are 
likelier to leave the fund ex post. This mitigation may not work if managers have short horizons 
and there are short-term performance fees. In such a case the industry association may provide 
return forecasts to all pension funds. This also preserves comparability of performance across 
pension funds. 
6. Concluding comments 
DC pension funds currently project expected benefits at retirement in a very limited set of 
countries, using either no risk scenario or a very limited number of scenarios –but for the case of 
Chile. Our reporting framework projects the distribution of outcomes at retirement associated 
with a large number of scenarios, thus making the plan member aware of both the upside 
                                                 
14 Besides, during periods of dramatic declines in equities prices, participants may not be willing to increase 
contributions fearing for the continuation of their jobs. 
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potential and the downside risk. This is in line with the desire of supervisory authorities, which 
are not only aware of the importance of projections, but also stress the need to convey to plan 
members the level of uncertainty surrounding expected benefits (OECD, 2010b; Rinaldi, and 
Giacomel, 2008).  
Another concern of the authorities has to do with the conflict of interest between fund members 
and pension providers, exacerbated by the poor understanding of the impact of cost and fees 
(Rinaldi and Giacomel, 2008). We address this problem as follows. First, we propose associating 
projections with the asset allocation chosen by the plan member, so as to make her aware of the 
higher risks associated with larger equity investments. Second, the plan member is able to assess 
ex-post pension fund performance against the latter previous projections, so as to curb the 
incentives to overstate future returns and pension benefits. Third, the return on the money-back-
benchmark is cost-free, thus implicitly putting an upper bound on charges. Thus the plan member 
can grasp the additional costs and downside risks of alternatives to the "money-back" benchmark 
at retirement. At the same time, this reporting framework has advantages for the industry as well, 
especially in terms of fair comparability with the benchmark and simple and effective 
communication. Indeed, the plan member also understands the costs of lower risk strategies in 
terms of foregone upside potential. Secondly, reports do not emphasize poor ex-post pension plan 
performance until the real return, net of costs, falls below zero. Finally, a longer-term assessment 
may mitigate the pension member’s reaction to poor short-term performance, which often results 
in withdrawals in bear markets.  
A final concern of regulators has to do with the actual framing of reports so as to ensure they are 
understood by plan members (OECD, 2010b). While this proposal does not address this issue in 
detail, we wish to stress that we limit the amount of information, knowing that too much 
information is equivalent to none. Indeed, we envisage the regular distribution of only two 
figures and tables with explanatory notes to all members. A website should contain information 
on assumptions, on the chosen asset allocation as well as disclaimers. More work on this aspect is 
postponed to future drafts. 
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Table I 
The Assumptions Underlying Projections 
The table reports assumptions concerning the parameters listed in the first column. Percentage 
returns and growth rates are annualized. The real returns on equity and bonds are assumed to be 
jointly log-normally distributed, and IID over time. 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
Standard Deviation 
    Inflation Rate (π) 0   
Real Returns on 10-year Duration Govt. Bonds 2.5 3.0 
Real Equity Returns 5.5 18 
Bond-Equity Return Correlation 0.1 // 
Inter-temporal Return Correlation 0 // 
Yearly Real Wage Growth Rate (w) 0  0 
Monthly Contribution 100  
Percentage Transaction Costs on New Contributions 0.5  
Percentage Yearly Fee on Assets Under Management 0.4  
Rebalancing Costs 0  
Tax rates 0  
 
 
Figure 1 
Asset allocation 
This figure explains to the worker the chosen asset allocation and how it evolves during life. In 
this example, the allocation entails 20% in bonds and 80% in stocks, with quarterly rebalancing. 
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Figure 2 
Projected pension assets at age 25 
This is the figure the worker sees when joining the pension fund at age 25. It reports projected 
pension assets from age 25 to age 65, when yearly contributions equal € 1,200. The benchmark 
"your money-back", which corresponds to a zero real rate of return, appears in black. Mean 
accumulated assets appear in white. The asset allocation entails 20% in bonds and 80% in stocks, 
with quarterly rebalancing. 
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Table II 
Key projected outcomes at 25 
The first column reports statistics relating to shortfall risk. The first row indicates the probability 
of not reaching the "money-back" benchmark after 40 years. The second, fourth and fifth rows 
indicate the average, maximum and minimum euro shortfall with respect to the benchmark. The 
second column shows the average, maximum and minimum accumulated assets. The last four 
rows indicate upper and lower percentile boundary figures for accumulated assets.   
 
 
  
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase 
Amount of assets 
after accumulation 
phase (40 years) 
Probability 3.35%   
Average -6,772.41 177,597.05 
st.dev 5,361.47 137,020.73 
Maximum -23,299.75 1,735,955.07 
Minimum -72.97 24,747.04 
  5 %   distr. upper bound         409,432.80  
1 5%   distr. upper bound         273,318.78  
15%   distr. lower bound          76,519.86  
 5%     distr. lower bound           53,064.12  
 
Figure 3 
Realized and projected pension assets at age 26 
This figure allows the worker to assess the yearly performance of her pension fund at age 26. It 
highlights with a white square mark, the actual ex-post accumulated assets against projected 
ones. In the picture both the white and black benchmarks are highlighted. 
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Figure 4 
Projected retirement assets at age 26 
This figure allows a 26-year-old worker to project her assets to age 65, conditional on one-year 
actual performance. Both the black and the white benchmark appear clearly.   
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Table III 
Key projected outcomes at 26. 
The first column reports statistics relating to shortfall risk one year later. The first row indicates 
the probability of not reaching the "money-back" benchmark after 39 years. The second, fourth 
and fifth rows indicate the average, maximum and minimum euro shortfall with respect to the 
benchmark. The second column shows the average, maximum and minimum accumulated assets. 
The last four rows indicate upper and lower percentile boundary figures for accumulated assets.  
 
  
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase 
Amount of assets 
after accumulation 
phase (39 years) 
Probability 3.80%   
Average -7,886.28 179,392.88 
st.dev 5,546.26 144,923.19 
Maximum -23,820.32 2,274,260.18 
Minimum -111.64 24,221.01 
  5 %   distr. upper bound           425,976.47  
1 5%   distr. upper bound           279,918.53  
15%   distr. lower bound            74,447.81  
 5%     distr. lower bound            51,211.86  
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Table IV 
The table IV shows all the results of the average monthly pension during retirement. The 
columns show the average monthly pay.  
 
Monthly pension equivalent of accumulated capital at retirement. 
This table reports the level of the real interest rate at retirement in the first row, and the associated 
average monthly pension pay in the second row. 
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
816.40 896.91 981.35 1,069.52 1,161.19 1,256.13 1,354.08 1,454.79 1,557.99 1,663.44 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Simulated and desired pension payments, deterministic interest rates and money-back 
benchmark. 
This figure reports the level of the real interest rate at retirement on the horizontal axis, and the 
monthly pension on the vertical one. The grey line indicates desired monthly pension, the darkest 
bars the average monthly pension, the darker and lighter bars a worse and better outcomes 
(respectively corresponding to the average minus/plus one standard deviation). In line with 
Figure 2, the black line indicates the real money-back benchmark, converted into monthly 
annuity payments, which rises with higher real interest rates. The grey line in the figure below 
shows the desired monthly pension per month, set at Euro € 875,00. 
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          Appendix A 
 
A.1. Stochastic interest rates.  
 
In Figure 5 we assumes ten exogenous interest rate levels. Of course, interest rates are not 
equally likely. Moreover, one should also account for the impact of realized interest rates on 
bond values. When these features are built in the model, projections reveal the effects of 
alternative asset allocations  on pension payment sensitivity to the interest rate.  Below we show 
the effects of a , one which gradually invests in long-term bonds over the accumulation phase,  
 
Figure A1 
Projected pension assets at age 25 with stochastic interest rate 
This figure is the counterpart of Figure 2, when the interest rate is simulated instead of the bond 
return. It reports projected pension assets from age 25 to age 65, when yearly contributions equal 
€ 1,200. The money-back benchmark appears in black. Mean accumulated assets appear in white. 
The asset allocation entails 20% in bonds and 80% in stocks, with quarterly rebalancing. 
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Table A1  
Key projected outcomes at age 25 with stochastic interest rate 
 
This table is the counterpart of Table II, when the interest rate is simulated instead of the bond 
return. The first column reports statistics relating to shortfall risk. The first row indicates the 
probability of not reaching the "money-back" benchmark after 40 years. The second, fourth and 
fifth rows indicate the average, maximum and minimum euro shortfall with respect to the 
benchmark. The second column shows the average, maximum and minimum accumulated assets. 
The last four rows indicate upper and lower percentile boundary figures for accumulated assets.   
 
 
 
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after  
accumulation phase 
Amount of assets 
after accumulation 
phase (40 years) 
Probability 3.35%  
Average -7,212.73 181,531.67 
st.dev 5,261.22 133,676.06 
Maximum -23,432.69 1,524,056.49 
Minimum -58.02 24,614.10 
  5 %   distr. upper bound   430,144.39  
1 5%   distr. upper bound   287,072.19  
15%   distr. lower bound   77,008.42  
 5%     distr. lower bound   52,425.33  
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Figure A2 
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates  
and money-back benchmark. 
 
This figure is the counterpart of Figure 5, when the interest rate is simulated instead of the bond 
return. It shows the level of the real interest rate at retirement on the horizontal axis, and the 
monthly pension on the vertical one. The grey line indicates desired monthly pension, the dots 
the simulated monthly pension payments. The black line indicates the real money-back annuity 
benchmark. The asset allocation entails 20% in bonds and 80% in stocks, with quarterly 
rebalancing. 
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In other terms, the pension provider may want to immunize prospective annuities from interest 
rates shocks, by “locking in” the portfolio prospective capitals needed for annuity payments. This 
can be done with bonds of similar maturity as annuity payments. But before getting into effective 
examples of immunization, we would like to analyze the impact of interest rate volatility. 
 
To this end, we repeat the exercise we performed in the main body of the paper, simulating the 
real interest rate on five-year duration bonds rather than the return on bonds. The interest rate 
distribution is assumed to be lognormal with constant mean of 2.2% and volatility of 1%. The 
correlation between equity returns and interest rates is assumed to be low in absolute value and 
negative (-0.1). Figure A1 and Table A1 are a fairly close replication of Figure 2 and Table II, 
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based on interest rate instead of bond total return simulation. Figure A2 portrays instead the 
simulated pension wage scenarios against realized interest rates. Now we see that higher interest 
rate scenarios are less likely than intermediate ones, and cases of negative real rates appear. In 
comparison to Figure 5, it reveals that most scenarios end up below benchmark even at 
intermediate rates of 4%-5%, and that some high average payments in Figure 5 may actually be 
associated with outliers.   
 
Importantly, the simulation of interest rates makes it possible to investigate whether alternative 
asset allocations better hedge interest rate risk at retirement, while still beating the benchmark. 
For instance, we may wonder whether an equity glide path, which progressively substitutes 
constant duration bonds to stocks, is a better hedge against interest rate variation. 
Figure A3 portrays the glide path. Figure A4 shows that the glide path substantially reduces very 
high and very low outcomes for accumulated assets, which is mirrored in a reduction in both 
shortfall probability and average accumulated assets. The following Figure A5 highlights that the 
glide path does not really help in shrinking interest rate sensitivity of pension income. 
 
To complete our investigation, we experiment with a20% equity, 80% five-year duration bonds 
allocation. Asset projections (see Figure A6) now reveal that shortfall risk is eliminated together 
with the upside potential. The impact on monthly pension payment is dramatic. Interest rate risk 
is hedged quite well, as the sensitivity of the monthly pension payment is very low. However the 
level of the pension payment is almost always below the desired pension payment. Thus, a clear 
trade-off emerges between reduced exposure to interest rates and upside potential.  
  
The choice of asset allocation depends on the choice of pension associates and provider. 
However, our reporting framework allows us to choose a "conformable" accumulation solution as 
a function of the nature of decumulation (fully annuitized, partly annuitized, based on capital 
drawdowns) and the life expectancy at retirement. Plan members that are forced to 100% 
annuitization will be more inclined to favor hedging of interest rate risk rather than trying to beat 
the benchmark. 
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FigureA3
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Figure A4 
Projected pension assets at age 25 
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A1, when the asset allocation entails a gradual reduction 
of the equity share from age 45 onwards, as represented in Figure A3. It reports projected 
pension assets from age 25 to age 65, when yearly contributions equal € 1,200. The money-back 
benchmark appears in black. Mean accumulated assets appear in white.  
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Table A2 
Key projected outcomes at age 25 
 
This table is the counterpart of Table A1, when the asset allocation entails a glide path, as 
indicated in Figure A3. 
 
 
 
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after  
accumulation phase 
Amount of assets 
after accumulation 
phase (40 years) 
Probability 1.75%   
Average -5,190.38 146,581.34 
st.dev 3,679.39 97,302.15 
Maximum -16,320.79 1,217,730.29 
Minimum -702.63 31,726.00 
 5 % distr. upper bound           327,911.80  
15% distr. upper bound           212,211.74  
15% distr. lower bound            74,520.50  
  5% distr. lower bound            59,545.56  
 
 
 
A.2.  Conformable portfolios 
 
This section provides other examples of portfolios that immunize, in varying degrees, the 
participant from interest rate volatility in the accumulation phase. The pension member, with the 
help of these projections, can choose the portfolio that best fits her needs of immunizing 
prospective annuities from interest rate volatility. 
 
 
A.2.1.  100% matching annuities with bonds immunization in the accumulation phase  
 
In this first example, contributions are invested in zero coupon bonds or swaps of decreasing 
maturity so as to provide 100% matching– as indicated in Figure A5. In Figure A6, the black line 
indicates the money-back (€ 48,000 in this case) benchmark. The dots form an almost flat line, 
indicating that the interest rate sensitivity of the monthly pension payment is minimal. It is 
apparent that the dots are always below the money-back benchmark in black. Thus, the 
benchmark appears unattainable with this asset allocation, since there are no equities and 
therefore no benefit from the equity risk premium. This is equally evident in Table A3, which 
reports statistics concerning accumulated assets at retirement. The probability of not reaching the 
benchmark is 1.  
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Figure A5  
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Figure A6  
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates  
and money-back benchmark. 
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A2, with stochastic interest rate, when the asset allocation 
entails 100% maturity matching, as indicated in Figure A5. 
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Table A3 
Key projected outcomes at age 25 
This table is the counterpart of Table A1, when the asset allocation entails 100% maturity matching, as 
indicated in Figure A5. 
  
Risk of not reaching 
target after acc. 
Phase 
Amount of assets 
after accumulation 
phase (40 years) 
Probability 100.00%   
Average -12,322.52 35,724.27 
st.dev 3,072.01 3,072.01 
Maximum -20,366.60 47,892.44 
Minimum -154.35 27,680.19 
 5 % distr. upper bound                   41,074.68  
15% distr. upper bound                   38,913.79  
15% distr. lower bound                   32,540.92  
  5% distr. lower bound                   30,889.37  
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A.2.2.  Constant 20% equity exposure and bonds immunization during accumulation.
 
 
In this second example, 20% of the portfolio is invested in equities, so as to take advantage of 
the risk premium, while the rest provides immunization from interest rate volatility (see Figure 
A7). Figure A8 shows that expected pension payments are now more sensitive to the interest 
rate, but it is more likely that the money-back benchmark is attained thanks to partial equity 
exposure.  
Figure A7 
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Figure A8 
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates and money-back benchmark. 
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A6 when the asset allocation is the one depicted in 
Figure A7. Note the different scale on the vertical axis. 
 
 -
 100.00
 200.00
 300.00
 400.00
 500.00
 600.00
 700.00
 800.00
 900.00
 1,000.00
-8.00% -6.00% -4.00% -2.00% 0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00%
20% return assets 80% matching Target monthly annuity Real money-back target
 
 
 
32 
 
A.2.3.Dynamic optimization with equities and bonds immunization during accumulation  
 
In this last example the exposure to equities is much higher and portfolio immunization with 
respect to expected annuities starts later, at age 45. The equity risk premium allows the 
participant to have higher expected returns but of course implies a broader risk cone. An 
alternative representation of Figure A10 below, which echoes Figure 5, is given in Figure A11. 
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Figure A10  
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates and money-back benchmark. 
This figure is the counterpart of Figure A6 when the asset allocation is the glide path depicted 
in Figure A9. 
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Figure A11  
Simulated and desired pension payments, stochastic interest rates and money-back benchmark 
This figure is the counterpart of Figure 5, when the real interest rate is stochastic. The real 
interest rate at retirement is on the horizontal axis, and the monthly pension on the vertical one. 
The asset allocation is the glide path depicted in Figure A9. 
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Appendix B 
Communicating Projections and Performance Results in Current Euros 
 
 
The hypothesis of zero real wage growth is not a necessary component of our model.15 We now 
assume a 2% real wage growth forecast for the next 40 years, which sets the money-back 
benchmark at € 73,023.75. 
 
Table B1 
 
Contribution per month per person invested 100.00 
 
Percentage Real Wage growth per year 2.00% 
 
Investment horizon 40 year 
 
Benchmark capital, in t=0 Euro 73,023.75 
 
Pay-out time annuity 20 year 
 
Real Return low-risk assets 2.5% 
 
Real Risk low-risk assets 3.0% 
 
Real Return high-return assets 5.5% 
 
Risk high-return assets 18.0% 
 
Correlation 10% 
 
Asset allocation low-risk assets 20% 
 
Asset allocation high-return assets 80% 
 
Start capital (t=0) 0.00  
 
 
Of course the model can also be run with alternative hypotheses. What matters is to (a) keep the 
same scenario as in the previous year, when evaluating ex post performance (b), revising the 
inputs for the new projections, on the basis of realized inflation and wage growth. 10 We use a 
negative real wage growth case in the next section, where we address the issue of the effect of 
inflation on “re-basing” the projections from one year to the next. 
 
 
B.1. Rebasing projections year after year and the effect of inflation 
 
Reports expressed in terms of constant purchasing power may no longer bear a correspondence 
with current purchasing power of plan members after some years, in inflationary scenarios. This 
                                                 
15
 The industry association that promotes the reporting standard among its members may 
choose the institution providing the inflation and wage forecasts, as well as the ex post figures, 
to all pension funds. A personalized pension simulator, such as the Chilean one, may also 
deliver individual wage forecast  along the lines of Cocco et al. (2005).    
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section explains how to change the base year so as to report in current euro, accounting for non-
neutral inflation effects. 
 
Suppose CPI inflation, between t=0 and t=1, equaled 3.0%. That means that our original 
benchmark capital should be raised to € 73,023.75 x 1.03 = € 75,214.46 in order to keep the real 
benchmark constant. If inflation had been anticipated so that nominal returns were 3% higher 
than the real one; and if wage inflation had also been equal to 3%, due to indexation, then 
contributions as a share of nominal wage will also increase to 103. Thus there would only be 
nominal changes.  
 
Realized inflation affects instead real projected outcomes if returns and incomes do not grow 
proportionally with inflation, i.e., when contracts are not perfectly indexed and/or inflation is 
unexpected.16  
For instance, assume nominal wage growth is only 2% instead of 3% between t=0 and t=1. This 
implies that real contributions (rebased in year 1) will now be equal to 102.00 per month, unless 
the plan member decides to save a higher share of his real income. So the new set of inputs for 
the projections, with base year t=1, are the ones in the table below. 
 
Table B2 
The table reports the values of the parameters listed in the first column, expressed in t=1 Euro. Figures 
that differ from the ones in Table B1 are in bold. Percentage returns and growth rates are annualized. The 
real returns on equity and bonds are assumed to be jointly log-normally distributed, and IID over time. 
 
Contribution per month per person invested 102.00 
 
Percentage Real Wage growth per year (expected) 2.00% 
 
Investment horizon 39 year 
 
 
Benchmark capital, in t=1 Euro with no erosion in year 0 
Benchmark capital in t=1 given erosion in year 0 
75,214.47 
 73,009.79. 
 
Pay-out time annuity 20 year 
 
Real Return low-risk assets 2.5% 
 
Real Risk low-risk assets 3.0% 
 
Real Return high-return assets 5.5% 
 
Risk high-return assets 18.0% 
 
Correlation 10% 
 
Asset allocation low-risk assets 20% 
 
Asset allocation high-return assets 80% 
 
Start capital (t=1) 1,195.00  
 
With the inputs stated above, projected accumulated assets at retirement as a result of 
contributions, wage growth and investment horizon are equal to € 73,009.79. Therefore the 
higher benchmark capital of €75,214.47 (0.1703%) requires a higher return on investments. This 
adds to the gross return on investment needed to compensate for yearly AUM fees and 
                                                 
16
 This is the case also if the tax system, which relies on nominal income, is progressive. For the sake of 
simplicity, we set the tax rate to zero. 
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transaction costs, which become 0.599% from 0.43%. In other words, inflation has reduced the 
real value of contributions, and this also raises the risk of not reaching this benchmark, as 
displayed in Table B3 below.  
 
Table B3 
 
 
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after  
accumulation phase 
Amount of assets 
after accumulation 
phase (39 years) 
Probability 3.60%  
Average -13,986.61 249,033.30 
st.dev 10,755.33 185,924.08 
Maximum -41,852.74 2,214,411.14 
Minimum -156.64 34,841.41 
 5 % distr. upper bound   596,440.68  
15% distr. upper bound   373,717.35  
15% distr. lower bound   110,889.78  
  5% distr. lower bound   82,086.59  
 
Notice that the plan member may want to consider raising her monthly contributions in order to 
increase the chance of reaching her desired pension wage. If she increases, at t=1, her monthly 
contribution to 120, benchmark capital becomes 85,682.99.  
 
Table B4 
 
Risk of not reaching 
benchmark after 
accumulation phase 
Amount of assets 
after accumulation 
phase (39 years) 
Probability 3.65%  
Average -14,675.33 284,369.41 
st.dev 11,727.50 193,188.74 
Maximum -41,270.85 1,854,148.70 
Minimum -68.90 46,122.94 
 5 % distr. upper bound  661,641.84 
15% distr. upper bound  439,363.17 
15% distr. lower bound  129,111.85 
  5% distr. lower bound  92,575.40 
 
 
 
 
Our papers can be downloaded at: 
http://cerp.carloalberto.org/en/publications
 
CeRP Working Paper Series 
 
N° 143/14 Kees de Vaan 
Daniele Fano 
Herialt Mens  
Giovanna Nicodano 
A Reporting Standard for Defined Contribution Pension Plans 
N° 142/14 Elisabetta Cagna 
Giulio Casuccio 
Equally-weighted Risk Contribution Portfolios: an empirical 
study using expected shortfall 
N° 141/14 Massimo Baldini 
Costanza Torricelli 
Maria Cesira Urzì Brancati 
Family ties: occupational responses to cope with a household 
income shock 
N° 140/14 Cecilia Boggio 
Elsa Fornero 
Henriette Prast 
Jose Sanders 
Seven Ways to Knit Your Portfolio: Is Investor Communication 
Neutral? 
N° 139/14 Laura Bianchini  
Margherita Borella 
Cognitive Functioning and Retirement in Europe  
  
N° 138/13 Claudio Morana  
 
Insights on the global macro-finance interface: Structural sources 
of risk factors fluctuations and the cross-section of expected  
stock returns  
N° 137/13 Claudio Morana  
 
New Insights on the US OIS Spreads Term Structure During the  
Recent Financial Turmoil  
N° 136/13 Anna Lo Prete  
 
Inequality and the finance you know: does economic literacy  
matter?  
N° 135/13 Rik Dillingh  
Henriette Prast  
Mariacristina Rossi  
Cesira Urzì Brancati 
The psychology and economics of reverse mortgage attitudes:  
evidence from the Netherlands  
 
N° 134/13 Annamaria Lusardi  
Olivia S. Mitchell 
The Economic Importance of Financial Literacy: Theory and  
Evidence   
N° 133/13 Annamaria Lusardi 
Pierre-Carl Michaud 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Optimal Financial Knowledge and Wealth Inequality 
N° 132/13 Riccardo Calcagno 
Sonia Falconieri 
Competition and dynamics of takeover contests 
N° 131/13 Riccardo Calcagno 
Maria Cesira Urzì Brancati 
Do more financially literate households invest less in housing? 
Evidence from Italy 
N° 130/12 Maela Giofré Financial Education, Investor Protection and International 
Portfolio Diversification 
N° 129/12 Michele Belloni 
Rob Alessie 
Adriaan Kalwij 
Chiara Marinacci 
Lifetime Income and Old Age Mortality Risk in Italy over Two 
Decades 
N° 128/12 Fabio Cesare Bagliano 
Claudio Morana 
Determinants of US Financial Fragility Conditions 
N° 127/12 Mariacristina Rossi 
Serena Trucchi 
Liquidity Constraints and Labor Supply 
N° 126/11 Margherita Borella 
Flavia Coda Moscarola 
Mariacristina Rossi 
 
(Un)expected retirement and the consumption puzzle 
N° 125/11 Carolina Fugazza 
 
Tracking the Italian employees’ TFR over their working life 
careers 
 
N° 124/11 Agnese Romiti 
Mariacristina Rossi 
 
Should we Retire Earlier in order to Look After our Parents? 
The Role of immigrants 
N° 123/11 Elsa Fornero 
Maria Cristina Rossi 
Maria Cesira Urzì Brancati 
 
Explaining why, right or wrong, (Italian) households do not like 
reverse mortgages 
N° 122/11 Serena Trucchi How credit markets affect homeownership: an explanation based 
on differences between Italian regions 
N° 121/11 Elsa Fornero 
Chiara Monticone 
Serena Trucchi 
 
The effect of financial literacy on mortgage choices 
N° 120/11 Giovanni Mastrobuoni 
Filippo Taddei 
Age Before Beauty? Productivity and Work vs. Seniority 
and Early Retirement 
N° 119/11 Maarten van Rooij 
Annamaria Lusardi 
Rob Alessie  
Financial Literacy, Retirement Planning, and Household Wealth 
N° 118/11 Luca Beltrametti 
Matteo Della Valle 
Does the implicit pension debt mean anything after all? 
N° 117/11 Riccardo Calcagno 
Chiara Monticone 
Financial Literacy and the Demand for Financial Advice 
N° 116/11 Annamaria Lusardi 
Daniel Schneider 
Peter Tufano 
Financially Fragile Households: Evidence and Implications 
N° 115/11 Adele Atkinson 
Flore-Anne Messy 
Assessing financial literacy in 12 countries: an OECD Pilot 
Exercise 
N° 114/11 Leora Klapper 
Georgios A. Panos 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in View of a 
Growing Youth Demographic: The Russian Case 
N° 113/11 Diana Crossan 
David Feslier 
Roger Hurnard 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in New Zealand 
N° 112/11 Johan Almenberg 
Jenny Säve-Söderbergh 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in Sweden 
N° 111/11 Elsa Fornero 
Chiara Monticone 
Financial Literacy and Pension Plan Participation in Italy 
N° 110/11 Rob Alessie 
Maarten Van Rooij 
Annamaria Lusardi 
Financial Literacy, Retirement Preparation and Pension 
Expectations in the Netherlands 
N° 109/11 Tabea Bucher-Koenen 
Annamaria Lusardi 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in Germany 
N° 108/11 Shizuka Sekita Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in Japan 
N° 107/11 Annamaria Lusardi  
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in the United States 
N° 106/11 Annamaria Lusardi  
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Financial Literacy Around the World: An Overview 
N° 105/11 Agnese Romiti Immigrants-Natives Complementarities in Production: Evidence 
from Italy 
N° 104/11 Ambrogio Rinaldi Pension awareness and nation-wide auto-enrolment: the Italian 
experience 
N° 103/10 Fabio Bagliano 
Claudio Morana 
The Great Recession: US dynamics and spillovers to the world 
economy 
N° 102/10 Nuno Cassola 
Claudio Morana 
The 2007-? financial crisis: a money market perspective 
N° 101/10 Tetyana Dubovyk Macroeconomic Aspects of Italian Pension Reforms of 1990s 
N° 100/10  Laura Piatti 
Giuseppe Rocco 
L’educazione e la comunicazione previdenziale - Il caso italiano 
N° 99/10 Fabio Bagliano 
Claudio Morana 
The effects of US economic and financial crises on euro area 
convergence 
N° 98/10 Annamaria Lusardi 
Daniel Schneider 
Peter Tufano 
 
The Economic Crisis and Medical Care Usage 
N° 97/10 Carlo Maccheroni 
Tiziana Barugola 
E se l’aspettativa di vita continuasse la sua crescita? Alcune 
ipotesi per le generazioni italiane 1950-2005 
N° 96/10 Riccardo Calcagno 
Mariacristina Rossi 
Portfolio Choice and Precautionary Savings 
N° 95/10 Flavia Coda Moscarola 
Elsa Fornero 
Mariacristina Rossi 
Parents/children “deals”: Inter-Vivos Transfers and Living 
Proximity 
N° 94/10 John A. List 
Sally Sadoff 
Mathis Wagner 
 
So you want to run an experiment, now what? Some Simple 
Rules of Thumb for Optimal Experimental Design 
N° 93/10 Mathis Wagner The Heterogeneous Labor Market Effects of Immigration 
N° 92/10  Rob Alessie  
Michele Belloni 
Retirement choices in Italy: what an option value model tells us 
N° 91/09 Annamaria Lusardi 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Vilsa Curto 
Financial Literacy among the Young:  
Evidence and Implications for Consumer Policy 
N° 90/09 Annamaria Lusardi 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
How Ordinary Consumers Make Complex Economic Decisions: 
Financial Literacy and Retirement Readiness 
N° 89/09 Elena Vigna Mean-variance inefficiency of CRRA and CARA utility 
functions for portfolio selection in defined contribution pension 
schemes 
N° 88/09 Maela Giofré Convergence of EMU Equity Portfolios 
N° 87/09 Elsa Fornero 
Annamaria Lusardi 
Chiara Monticone 
Adequacy of Saving for Old Age in Europe 
N° 86/09 Margherita Borella 
Flavia Coda Moscarola 
Microsimulation of Pension Reforms: Behavioural versus 
Nonbehavioural Approach 
N° 85/09 Cathal O’Donoghue 
John Lennon 
Stephen Hynes 
The Life-Cycle Income Analysis Model (LIAM): A Study of a 
Flexible Dynamic Microsimulation Modelling Computing 
Framework 
N° 84/09 Luca Spataro Il sistema previdenziale italiano dallo shock petrolifero del 1973 
al Trattato di Maastricht del 1993 
N° 83/09 Annamaria Lusardi 
Peter Tufano 
Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, and Overindebtedness 
N° 82/09 Carolina Fugazza 
Massimo Guidolin 
Giovanna Nicodano 
Time and Risk Diversification in Real Estate Investments: 
Assessing the Ex Post Economic Value 
N° 81/09 Fabio Bagliano 
Claudio Morana 
Permanent and Transitory Dynamics in House Prices and 
Consumption: Cross-Country Evidence 
N° 80/08 Claudio Campanale Learning, Ambiguity and Life-Cycle Portfolio Allocation 
N° 79/08 Annamaria Lusardi Increasing the Effectiveness of Financial Education in the 
Workplace 
N° 78/08 Margherita Borella 
Giovanna Segre 
Le pensioni dei lavoratori parasubordinati: prospettive dopo un 
decennio di gestione separata 
N° 77/08 Giovanni Guazzarotti  
Pietro Tommasino 
The Annuity Market in an Evolving Pension System: Lessons 
from Italy 
N° 76/08 Riccardo Calcagno 
Elsa Fornero 
Mariacristina Rossi 
The Effect of House Prices on Household Saving: The Case of 
Italy 
 
N° 75/08 Harold Alderman 
Johannes Hoogeveen 
Mariacristina Rossi 
Preschool Nutrition and Subsequent Schooling Attainment: 
Longitudinal Evidence from Tanzania 
N° 74/08 Maela Giofré Information Asymmetries and Foreign Equity Portfolios:  
Households versus Financial Investors 
N° 73/08 Michele Belloni 
Rob Alessie 
The Importance of Financial Incentives on Retirement Choices: 
New Evidence for Italy 
N° 72/08 Annamaria Lusardi 
Olivia Mitchell 
Planning and Financial Literacy: How Do Women Fare? 
 
N° 71/07 Flavia Coda Moscarola Women participation and caring decisions: do different 
institutional frameworks matter? A comparison between Italy and 
The Netherlands 
 
N° 70/07 Radha Iyengar  
Giovanni Mastrobuoni 
The Political Economy of the Disability Insurance. Theory and 
Evidence of Gubernatorial Learning from Social Security 
Administration Monitoring 
 
N° 69/07 Carolina Fugazza 
Massimo Guidolin 
Giovanna Nicodano 
 
Investing in Mixed Asset Portfolios: the Ex-Post Performance 
N° 68/07 Massimo Guidolin 
Giovanna Nicodano 
 
Small Caps in International Diversified Portfolios 
N° 67/07 Carolina Fugazza 
Maela Giofré 
Giovanna Nicodano 
 
International Diversification and Labor Income Risk 
N° 66/07 Maarten van Rooij 
Annamaria Lusardi 
Rob Alessie 
Financial Literacy and Stock Market Participation 
N° 65/07 Annamaria Lusardi Household Saving Behavior: The Role of Literacy, Information 
and Financial Education Programs 
(Updated version June 08: “Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool 
for Informed Consumer Choice?”) 
N° 64/07 Carlo Casarosa  
Luca Spataro 
Rate of Growth of Population, Saving and Wealth in the Basic 
Life-cycle Model when the Household is the Decision Unit 
 
N° 63/07 Claudio Campanale Life-Cycle Portfolio Choice: The Role of Heterogeneous Under-
Diversification 
N° 62/07 Margherita Borella 
Elsa Fornero 
Mariacristina Rossi 
Does Consumption Respond to Predicted Increases in Cash-on-
hand Availability? Evidence from the Italian “Severance Pay” 
 
N° 61/07 Irina Kovrova Effects of the Introduction of a Funded Pillar on the Russian 
Household Savings: Evidence from the 2002 Pension Reform 
N° 60/07 Riccardo Cesari 
Giuseppe Grande 
Fabio Panetta 
La Previdenza Complementare in Italia: 
Caratteristiche, Sviluppo e Opportunità per i Lavoratori 
N° 59/07 Riccardo Calcagno 
Roman Kraeussl 
Chiara Monticone 
An Analysis of the Effects of the Severance Pay Reform on 
Credit to Italian SMEs 
N° 58/07 Elisa Luciano 
Jaap Spreeuw 
Elena Vigna 
 
Modelling Stochastic Mortality for Dependent Lives 
N° 57/07 Giovanni Mastrobuoni 
Matthew Weinberg 
Heterogeneity in Intra-Monthly Consumption. Patterns, Self-
Control, and Savings at Retirement 
N° 56/07 John A. Turner 
Satyendra Verma 
Why Some Workers Don’t Take 401(k) Plan Offers: 
Inertia versus Economics  
N° 55/06 Antonio Abatemarco On the Measurement of Intra-Generational Lifetime 
Redistribution in Pension Systems 
N° 54/06 Annamaria Lusardi 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
 
Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Roles of Planning, 
Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth 
N° 53/06 Giovanni Mastrobuoni Labor Supply Effects of the Recent Social Security Benefit Cuts: 
Empirical Estimates Using Cohort Discontinuities 
N° 52/06 Luigi Guiso 
Tullio Jappelli 
Information Acquisition and Portfolio Performance 
N° 51/06 Giovanni Mastrobuoni The Social Security Earnings Test Removal. Money Saved or 
Money Spent by the Trust Fund? 
N° 50/06 Andrea Buffa 
Chiara Monticone 
Do European Pension Reforms Improve the Adequacy of 
Saving? 
N° 49/06 Mariacristina Rossi Examining the Interaction between Saving and Contributions to 
Personal Pension Plans. Evidence from the BHPS 
N° 48/06 Onorato Castellino 
Elsa Fornero 
Public Policy and the Transition to Private Pension Provision in 
the United States and Europe 
N° 47/06 Michele Belloni 
Carlo Maccheroni 
Actuarial Neutrality when Longevity Increases: An Application 
to the Italian Pension System 
N° 46/05 Annamaria Lusardi 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
Financial Literacy and Planning: Implications for Retirement 
Wellbeing 
N° 45/05 Claudio Campanale Increasing Returns to Savings and Wealth Inequality 
N° 44/05 Henrik Cronqvist Advertising and Portfolio Choice  
N° 43/05 John Beshears 
James J. Choi 
David Laibson 
The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Saving 
Outcomes: Evidence from the United States 
Brigitte C. Madrian 
N° 42/05 Margherita Borella 
Flavia Coda Moscarola 
Distributive Properties of Pensions Systems: a Simulation of the 
Italian Transition from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution 
N° 41/05 Massimo Guidolin  
Giovanna Nicodano 
Small Caps in International Equity Portfolios: The Effects of 
Variance Risk. 
 
N° 40/05 Carolina Fugazza 
Massimo Guidolin  
Giovanna Nicodano 
Investing for the Long-Run in European Real Estate. Does 
Predictability Matter? 
N° 39/05 Anna Rita Bacinello Modelling the Surrender Conditions in Equity-Linked Life 
Insurance 
N° 38/05 Carolina Fugazza 
Federica Teppa 
An Empirical Assessment of the Italian Severance Payment 
(TFR)  
N° 37/04 Jay Ginn Actuarial Fairness or Social Justice? 
A Gender Perspective on Redistribution in Pension Systems 
N° 36/04 Laurence J. Kotlikoff Pensions Systems and the Intergenerational Distribution of 
Resources 
N° 35/04 Monika Bütler 
Olivia Huguenin 
Federica Teppa 
 
What Triggers Early Retirement. Results from Swiss Pension 
Funds 
N° 34/04 Chourouk Houssi Le Vieillissement Démographique : 
Problématique des Régimes de Pension en Tunisie 
N° 33/04 Elsa Fornero 
Carolina Fugazza 
Giacomo Ponzetto 
 
A Comparative Analysis of the Costs of Italian Individual 
Pension Plans 
N° 32/04 Angelo Marano 
Paolo Sestito 
Older Workers and Pensioners: the Challenge of Ageing on the 
Italian Public Pension System and Labour Market 
N° 31/03 Giacomo Ponzetto Risk Aversion and the Utility of Annuities 
N° 30/03 Bas Arts 
Elena Vigna 
A Switch Criterion for Defined Contribution Pension Schemes 
N° 29/02 Marco Taboga The Realized Equity Premium has been Higher than Expected: 
Further Evidence 
N° 28/02 Luca Spataro New Tools in Micromodeling Retirement Decisions: Overview 
and Applications to the Italian Case 
N° 27/02 Reinhold Schnabel Annuities in Germany before and after the Pension Reform of 
2001 
N° 26/02 E. Philip Davis Issues in the Regulation of Annuities Markets 
N° 25/02 Edmund Cannon  
Ian Tonks 
The Behaviour of UK Annuity Prices from 1972 to the Present 
N° 24/02 Laura Ballotta  
Steven Haberman 
Valuation of Guaranteed Annuity Conversion Options 
N° 23/02 Ermanno Pitacco Longevity Risk in Living Benefits 
N° 22/02 Chris Soares 
Mark Warshawsky 
Annuity Risk: Volatility and Inflation Exposure in Payments 
from Immediate Life Annuities 
N° 21/02 Olivia S. Mitchell  
David McCarthy 
Annuities for an Ageing World 
N° 20/02 Mauro Mastrogiacomo Dual Retirement in Italy and Expectations 
N° 19/02 Paolo Battocchio 
Francesco Menoncin 
 
Optimal Portfolio Strategies with Stochastic Wage Income and 
Inflation:  The Case of a Defined Contribution Pension Plan 
N° 18/02 Francesco Daveri Labor Taxes and Unemployment: a Survey of the Aggregate 
Evidence 
N° 17/02 Richard Disney and  
Sarah Smith 
The Labour Supply Effect of the Abolition of the Earnings Rule 
for Older Workers in the United Kingdom 
N° 16/01 Estelle James and 
Xue Song 
 
Annuities Markets Around the World: Money’s Worth and Risk 
Intermediation 
N° 15/01 Estelle James How Can China Solve ist Old Age Security Problem? The 
Interaction Between Pension, SOE and Financial Market Reform 
N° 14/01 Thomas H. Noe Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure 
N° 13/01 Michela Scatigna Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance and Pension Funds 
N° 12/01 Roberta Romano Less is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance 
N° 11/01 Mara Faccio and Ameziane 
Lasfer 
Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: The Case 
of UK Pension Funds 
N° 10/01 Vincenzo Andrietti and Vincent 
Hildebrand 
Pension Portability and Labour Mobility in the United States. 
New Evidence from the SIPP Data 
N° 9/01 Hans Blommestein Ageing, Pension Reform, and Financial Market Implications in 
the OECD Area 
N° 8/01 Margherita Borella Social Security Systems and the Distribution of Income: an 
Application to the Italian Case 
N° 7/01 Margherita Borella The Error Structure of Earnings: an Analysis on Italian 
Longitudinal Data 
N° 6/01 Flavia Coda Moscarola The Effects of Immigration Inflows on the Sustainability of the 
Italian Welfare State 
N° 5/01 Vincenzo Andrietti Occupational Pensions and Interfirm Job Mobility in the 
European Union. Evidence from the ECHP Survey 
N° 4/01 Peter Diamond Towards an Optimal Social Security Design 
N° 3/00 Emanuele Baldacci 
Luca Inglese 
Le caratteristiche socio economiche dei pensionati in Italia. 
Analisi della distribuzione dei redditi da pensione (only available 
in the Italian version) 
N° 2/00 Pier Marco Ferraresi 
Elsa Fornero 
Social Security Transition in Italy: Costs, Distorsions and (some) 
Possible Correction 
N° 1/00 Guido Menzio Opting Out of Social Security over the Life Cycle 
 
